The object allocation problem with random priorities
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Publication:1651226
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010zbMath1400.91259OpenAlexW2795953683WikidataQ130042450 ScholiaQ130042450MaRDI QIDQ1651226
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010
claimwise stabilityconstrained probabilistic serial mechanismconstrained sd-efficiencyprobabilistic deferred acceptance mechanism
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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