Bounded rationality and repeated network formation

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.003zbMath1186.91049MaRDI QIDQ2381460

Nicolas Quérou, Sylvain Béal

Publication date: 18 September 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12169

zbMATH Keywords

automatabounded rationalitysubgame perfectionrepeated network formation gametwo-sided link formation costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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