Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization
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Cited in
(8)- Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations
- A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games
- Strategic behavior under partial cooperation
- Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
- Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function
- Cooperation for pennies: A note on \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria
- Partial cooperative equilibrium models and applications
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5148964 (Why is no real title available?)
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