Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization

DOI10.3390/G1030338MaRDI QIDQ2344945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Philippe Solal, Amandine Ghintran

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030338

zbMATH Keywords

network formationpartial cooperative equilibriumsupermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Review text

Summary: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

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Cited in

(8)

• Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations
• A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games
• Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function
• Cooperation for pennies: A note on \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria
• Partial cooperative equilibrium models and applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5148964 (Why is no real title available?)
• Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
• Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

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