Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization

DOI10.3390/G1030338zbMath1311.91062OpenAlexW1974967861MaRDI QIDQ2344945

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030338

zbMATH Keywords

network formationsupermodular gamespartial cooperative equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

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