The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach

DOI10.1007/S001820050010zbMATH Open0944.91003OpenAlexW2063396546MaRDI QIDQ1295837FDOQ1295837

Authors: Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato 

Publication date: 28 June 1999

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050010

zbMATH Keywords

coretragedy of the commonspartition function form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (33)

• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Games in sequencing situations with externalities
• Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources
• Sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with Leontief technologies
• Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
• Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
• On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
• Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
• Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• The unifying formalism of domination: Value, price, distribution and growth in joint production
• The “second economy” and resource allocation under central planning
• Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
• The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
• The core of voting games: a partition approach
• Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers
• The lattice of embedded subsets
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
• A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
• Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization
• The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
• Environmental stochasticity, Cournot competition and the prisoner's dilemma
• (Average-) convexity of common pool and oligopoly TU-games
• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• Linear-state differential games in partition function form
• Balanced environmental games
• Coalition formation in games with externalities

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