The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach

DOI10.1007/S001820050010MaRDI QIDQ1295837zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato

Publication date 28 June 1999

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050010

zbMATH Keywords

coretragedy of the commonspartition function form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited in

(33)

• Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
• Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources
• Sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with Leontief technologies
• The core of voting games: a partition approach
• Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• Balanced environmental games
• The “second economy” and resource allocation under central planning
• COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
• (Average-) convexity of common pool and oligopoly TU-games
• The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
• Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization
• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
• Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
• Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
• The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
• The lattice of embedded subsets
• Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
• Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
• Environmental stochasticity, Cournot competition and the prisoner's dilemma
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• Coalition formation in games with externalities
• Linear-state differential games in partition function form
• On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
• The unifying formalism of domination: Value, price, distribution and growth in joint production
• Games in sequencing situations with externalities

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