COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000941zbMath1197.91037OpenAlexW2002273042MaRDI QIDQ3421627

Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto, S. H. Tijs, Rodica Branzei

Publication date: 7 February 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000941

zbMATH Keywords

partition function form gamescompromise valuecomprisable gamesextensive form games (with perfect information)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Compromise values in cooperative game theory
• Notes on a new compromisw value: the_x-value^†
• N‐person games in partition function form

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