COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
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Publication:3421627
DOI10.1142/S0219198906000941zbMath1197.91037OpenAlexW2002273042MaRDI QIDQ3421627
Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto, S. H. Tijs, Rodica Branzei
Publication date: 7 February 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000941
partition function form gamescompromise valuecomprisable gamesextensive form games (with perfect information)
Cites Work
- An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
- Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
- A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Compromise values in cooperative game theory
- Notes on a new compromisw value: thex-value†
- N‐person games in partition function form
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