Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game

DOI10.1007/BF01780637zbMath0632.90095OpenAlexW2006071255MaRDI QIDQ1095819

Shmuel Zamir, Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01780637

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic approachcoalition structurereasonable payoff correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

The kernel for reasonable outcomes in a cooperative game ⋮ On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games ⋮ The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set ⋮ TWISTED DUAL GAMES AND THEIR PROPERTIES ⋮ Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games. ⋮ Bisection property of the kernel ⋮ Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility ⋮ Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games ⋮ COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• On the contribution of a player to a game
• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• An application of nonstandard analysis to game theory
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game