The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).

DOI10.1007/BF02937457zbMath0204.20301OpenAlexW2095875291MaRDI QIDQ2541583

Michael Maschler

Publication date: 1966

Published in: Israel Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02937457

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Continuity properties of solution concepts for cooperative games ⋮ Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game ⋮ Solution concepts of \(k\)-convex \(n\)-person games ⋮ The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games ⋮ Cores of combined games ⋮ On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set ⋮ Michael Maschler's bibliography ⋮ Intersecting balanced families of sets ⋮ On the contribution of a player to a game ⋮ The bargaining set for sharing the power ⋮ The kernel and bargaining set for convex games ⋮ Properties of 1-convex \(n\)-person games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}