The bargaining set for sharing the power
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Publication:744668
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A course in game theory.
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
- Open problems in veto theory
- The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
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