The bargaining set for sharing the power

DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1411-7zbMATH Open1303.91028OpenAlexW1972548480MaRDI QIDQ744668FDOQ744668

Authors: Michela Chessa, Vito Fragnelli 

Publication date: 26 September 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1411-7

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zbMATH Keywords

simple gamespower indicesbargaining setblackmailing behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A course in game theory.
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• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• Open problems in veto theory

Cited In (2)

• Partition function bargaining with public demands
• An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

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