An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2009.11.004zbMATH Open1182.91082OpenAlexW2079644996MaRDI QIDQ846484FDOQ846484

Authors: Kentaro Kojima, Takehiro Inohara 

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2009.11.004

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zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsrelationspowergame theorybargainingcooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The desirability relation of simple games
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation

Cited In (2)

• A strict partial order on payoff configurations and its some properties
• Methods for comparison of coalition influence on games in characteristic function form and their interrelationships

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