A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2006.10.035zbMath1137.91318OpenAlexW2090563851MaRDI QIDQ2371497

Keitarou Ishikawa, Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 4 July 2007

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2006.10.035

zbMATH Keywords

game theorygroup decision makingsimple gamesdesirability relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items

Collusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function form ⋮ An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set ⋮ Methods for comparison of coalition influence on games in characteristic function form and their interrelationships ⋮ A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation ⋮ Coalition values derived from methods for comparison of coalition influence for games in characteristic function form ⋮ A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations ⋮ OPEN PROBLEMS IN VETO THEORY

Cites Work

• The desirability relation of simple games
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
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