Methods for comparison of coalition influence on games in characteristic function form and their interrelationships

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2010.10.012MaRDI QIDQ618102zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kentaro Kojima, Takehiro Inohara

Publication date 14 January 2011

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2010.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsrelationsgame theoryinfluencecooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• The desirability relation of simple games

Cited in

(6)

• A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation
• Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• Coalition values derived from methods for comparison of coalition influence for games in characteristic function form
• Computation of several power indices by generating functions
• An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

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