On the contribution of a player to a game

DOI10.1007/BF01761602MaRDI QIDQ1245167zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors K. Appert

Publication date 1976

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01761602

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites work

• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• An application of nonstandard analysis to game theory
• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

Cited in

(5)

• Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus
• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
• Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus
• (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games
• On pseudo-Anosov autoequivalences

This page was built for publication: On the contribution of a player to a game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1245167)