Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function
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Publication:2102837
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2022.10.009OpenAlexW4307982705MaRDI QIDQ2102837
Publication date: 12 December 2022
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.10.009
existenceoligopolistic marketscooperative behaviormultivalued inverse demandStackelberg Cournot equilibria
Related Items (1)
Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs
Cites Work
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