Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games

DOI10.1007/BF00939867zbMath0631.90100OpenAlexW2000822214MaRDI QIDQ1095055

A. Alj, Michèle Breton, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00939867

zbMATH Keywords

Denardo contracting operator dynamic, two-person games sequential maxmin equilibrium sequential Nash equilibrium sequential Stackelberg equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (37)

The Stackelberg equilibrium for one-sided zero-sum partially observable stochastic games ⋮ Optimal Incentive Strategy in a Continuous Time Inverse Stackelberg Game ⋮ A stochastic games framework for verification and control of discrete time stochastic hybrid systems ⋮ Stability of regularized bilevel programming problems ⋮ Leader-following dynamic game of new product diffusion ⋮ Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty ⋮ Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts ⋮ Softening bilevel problems via two-scale Gibbs measures ⋮ A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition ⋮ Duality and optimality conditions for reverse convex programs via a convex decomposition ⋮ New necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for strong bilevel programming problems ⋮ Decentralized K-User Gaussian Multiple Access Channels ⋮ Weak stackelberg problem and mixed solutions under data perturbations¹¹this paper is based upon a communication presented at the 14th symposium on mathematical programming with data perturbation, Washington D.C. 1992. This research has been supported by M.U.R.S.T Roma, Italia.$ef: ⋮ $Q$-Learning in a Stochastic Stackelberg Game between an Uninformed Leader and a Naive Follower ⋮ Min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies with closed-loop information structure ⋮ Asymptotic behavior of semi-quasivariational optimistic bilevel problems in Banach spaces ⋮ Linear Temporal Logic Satisfaction in Adversarial Environments Using Secure Control Barrier Certificates ⋮ Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ Strong-weak nonlinear bilevel problems: existence of solutions in a sequential setting ⋮ Optimality Conditions for Semivectorial Bilevel Convex Optimal Control Problems ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership and demand functions possibly discontinuous ⋮ On the generic structure and stability of Stackelberg equilibria ⋮ Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: a learning approach via costs to move ⋮ Stackelberg equilibrium in a dynamic stimulation model with complete information ⋮ Optimistic minimax search for noncooperative switched control with or without dwell time ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy ⋮ Exploiting bounded rationality in risk-based cyber camouflage games ⋮ Mixed solutions for weak Stackelberg problems: existence and stability results. ⋮ Modeling and mitigating link-flooding distributed denial-of-service attacks via learning in Stackelberg games ⋮ Regularization and Approximation Methods in Stackelberg Games and Bilevel Optimization ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function ⋮ Automata-based controller synthesis for stochastic systems: a game framework via approximate probabilistic relations ⋮ $\epsilon$-mixed strategies for static continuous-kernel Stackelberg games ⋮ An Extended Fenchel--Lagrange Duality Approach and Optimality Conditions for Strong Bilevel Programming Problems

Cites Work

This page was built for publication: Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games