Exploiting bounded rationality in risk-based cyber camouflage games
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Cites work
- Approximation methods for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games: Modeling distributional payoff uncertainty
- Constraint-based optimization and utility elicitation using the minimax decision criterion
- Decision and game theory for security. First international conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22--23, 2010. Proceedings
- Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: an extended study
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Robust optimization
- Security and Game Theory
- Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games
- The Linear Programming Approach to Approximate Dynamic Programming
Cited in
(5)- Casino rationale: countering attacker deception in zero-sum Stackelberg security games of bounded rationality
- No Time to Lie: Bounds on the Learning Rate of a Defender for Inferring Attacker Target Preferences
- Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games
- Risk-Distortion Analysis for Video Collusion Attacks: A Mouse-and-Cat Game
- Interdicting Attack Plans with Boundedly Rational Players and Multiple Attackers: An Adversarial Risk Analysis Approach
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