Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
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Publication:2238721
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103549OpenAlexW3175047616MaRDI QIDQ2238721
Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi, Matteo Castiglioni
Publication date: 2 November 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103549
Uses Software
Cites Work
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