A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:475356
DOI10.1007/s11228-014-0292-5zbMath1307.91046arXiv1206.2968OpenAlexW2045047916MaRDI QIDQ475356
Uday V. Shanbhag, Ankur A. Kulkarni
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Set-Valued and Variational Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2968
Stackelberg equilibriumnonconvex optimizationmathematical programs with equilibrium constraintspotential gamesequilibrium problems with equilibrium constraintmulti-leader multi-follower gamesshared-constraints
Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (28)
Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response ⋮ Price-coupling games and the generation expansion planning problem ⋮ Extensions of Nash Games in Finite and Infinite Dimensions with Applications ⋮ A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management ⋮ National-strategic investment in European power transmission capacity ⋮ Games and teams with shared constraints ⋮ Basic theoretical foundations and insights on bilevel models and their applications to power systems ⋮ Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs ⋮ Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information ⋮ Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets ⋮ Multilevel multi-leader multiple-follower games with nonseparable objectives and shared constraints ⋮ On the computation of equilibria in monotone and potential stochastic hierarchical games ⋮ Solving normalized stationary points of a class of equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints ⋮ Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders ⋮ Network expansion to mitigate market power ⋮ Multimodal transportation flows in energy networks with an application to crude oil markets ⋮ An MPEC reformulation of an EPEC model for electricity markets ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy ⋮ On describing the solution sets of generalized Nash games with shared constraints ⋮ On the efficiency of local electricity markets under decentralized and centralized designs: a multi-leader Stackelberg game analysis ⋮ Generic stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium with strategy transformational barriers ⋮ A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction ⋮ Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design ⋮ A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management ⋮ Genericity Analysis of Multi-Leader-Disjoint-Followers Game ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games ⋮ A Unified Framework for Multistage Mixed Integer Linear Optimization ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the variational equilibrium as a refinement of the generalized Nash equilibrium
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
- Nonsmooth approach to optimization problems with equilibrium constraints. Theory, applications and numerical results
- Revisiting generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
- Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
- Potential games
- Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
- Optimality conditions for disjunctive programs with application to mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints
- On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
- Analysis on the forward market equilibrium model
- Mathematical Programs with Complementarity Constraints: Stationarity, Optimality, and Sensitivity
- Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market
- An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games
- On the Impact of Forward Markets on Investments in Oligopolistic Markets with Reference to Electricity
- A Stochastic Multiple-Leader Stackelberg Model: Analysis, Computation, and Application
- Solving multi-leader–common-follower games
- Nonconvex Games with Side Constraints
- A Complementarity Framework for Forward Contracting Under Uncertainty
- Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
- Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
- A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
- Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
- Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems
- Local Convergence of SQP Methods for Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
- Point-to-Set Maps in Mathematical Programming
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Fixed Point Theorems for Multi-Valued Transformations
- Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
- Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
This page was built for publication: A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
