A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
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Publication:475356
DOI10.1007/S11228-014-0292-5zbMATH Open1307.91046arXiv1206.2968OpenAlexW2045047916MaRDI QIDQ475356FDOQ475356
Authors: Ankur A. Kulkarni, Uday V. Shanbhag 
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Set-Valued and Variational Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria for it has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2968
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nonconvex optimizationmathematical programs with equilibrium constraintspotential gamesStackelberg equilibriumequilibrium problems with equilibrium constraintmulti-leader multi-follower gamesshared-constraints
Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Dynamic games (91A25) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
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