Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets
DOI10.1137/20m1353538zbMath1522.90233OpenAlexW4385494388MaRDI QIDQ6116252
Claudia A. Sagastizábal, Steven A. Gabriel, Juan Pablo Luna, Unnamed Author, Mikhail V. Solodov
Publication date: 11 August 2023
Published in: SIAM Journal on Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/20m1353538
energy marketsequilibrium problems with equilibrium constraintsdual-primal regularizationmultileader single-follower games
Noncooperative games (91A10) Numerical methods based on necessary conditions (49M05) Newton-type methods (49M15) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)
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