Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market

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Publication:2911436


DOI10.1051/cocv/2011003zbMath1281.90056MaRDI QIDQ2911436

René Henrion, Jiří V. Outrata, Thomas M. Surowiec

Publication date: 31 August 2012

Published in: ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eudml.org/doc/221922


90C30: Nonlinear programming

49J53: Set-valued and variational analysis


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