complementarityenergy marketequilibriagame theory problemsmodelingsupply and demandvariational inequalities
General theory of mathematical modeling (00A71) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Optimality conditions and duality in mathematical programming (90C46) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
This is a good readable book showing -- with the energy market as background -- how the big optimization fields as duality, complementarity, equilibria, Kuhn-Tucker conditions act together (in finite dimensions and with algorithmic procedures). The authors choose an interesting method for the structure of their book, they avoid proofs (instead there are many hints to find them in the references) and give to (almost) all critical or better said interesting points of optimization a lot of application-oriented examples and remarks, rich in content and, as is easily seen, supported by a big experience of the authors in these fields. References are given separately at the end of each of the 12 chapters and the appendices. An index is existent for the whole book. Going into details one could emphasize some of the main topics of the content as Nash-Cournot duopoly expressed as a variational inequality, programs with equilibrium constraints, constraint qualifications, topics around supply and demand, Pareto efficiency and social welfare, multi-level games, different equilibrium problems (integer-constraint, stochastic effects), and as chapters 5 to 7 problems with variational inequalities (also quasi-variational inequalities), optimization problems with different side conditions, equilibrium problems (perfect, Cournot and Bertrand competition). The chapters 8 and 9 follow containing algorithms (Lemke, matrix splitting, Newton's method, links to KTT, projections, merit functions and decompositions (with respect to stochastic effects, penalization, regularization and diagonalization). Chapters 10 and 11 deal with natural gas market modeling (gas storage, capacity problems, transportation problems) and electricity and environmental markets (transmission-constrained markets, oligopolistic markets, emissions trading). Finally chapter 12 is devoted to modeling in the demand side linkages among multiple energy markets (cross-price elasticity) and its interpretation. Appendix B (more than 30 pages) provides GAMS codes for some of the examples presented in the book.
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- A Mixed Complementarity-Based Equilibrium Model of Natural Gas Markets
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- A generalized Nash equilibrium model of market coupling in the European power system
- Bilevel programming problems. Theory, algorithms and applications to energy networks
- Solving stochastic complementarity problems in energy market modeling using scenario reduction
- Modelling a sector undergoing structural change: The case of Danish energy supply
- Solving discretely constrained mixed complementarity problems using a median function
- On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach
- On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity
- Evaluating the impacts of the external supply risk in a natural gas supply chain: the case of the Italian market
- Measuring the effects of price controls using mixed complementarity models
- Large-scale unit commitment under uncertainty: an updated literature survey
- Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
- Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets
- Alternative models for markets with nonconvexities
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in data envelopment analysis
- Capacity expansion under uncertainty in an oligopoly using indirect reinforcement-learning
- Complementarity, equilibrium, efficiency and economics
- An RLT approach for solving the binary-constrained mixed linear complementarity problem
- Multimodal transportation flows in energy networks with an application to crude oil markets
- Perfect competition vs. strategic behaviour models to derive electricity prices and the influence of renewables on market power
- Analysis of futures and spot electricity markets under risk aversion
- Solving certain complementarity problems in power markets via convex programming
- Ambiguities and nonmonotonicities under prosumer power. Optimal distributed energy resource investment in a deregulated electricity industry
- A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
- Using inverse optimization to learn cost functions in generalized Nash games
- Finding multiple Nash equilibria via machine learning-supported Gröbner bases
- Solving oligopolistic equilibrium problems with convex optimization
- On the efficiency of local electricity markets under decentralized and centralized designs: a multi-leader Stackelberg game analysis
- Large-scale unit commitment under uncertainty
- Electric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg game
- Multicriteria energy policy investments and energy market clearance via integer programming
- Basic theoretical foundations and insights on bilevel models and their applications to power systems
- A multilevel model of the European entry-exit gas market
- Solving binary-constrained mixed complementarity problems using continuous reformulations
- Market power and efficiency analysis in bi-level energy transmission market
- Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets
- Removing cross-border capacity bottlenecks in the European natural gas market -- a proposed merchant-regulatory mechanism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5812022 (Why is no real title available?)
- A bilevel approach to optimize electricity prices
- Nonlinear complementarity approach to the pricing of spinning reserve market
- A rolling horizon approach for stochastic mixed complementarity problems with endogenous learning: application to natural gas markets
- The National Energy Modeling System: A Large-Scale Energy-Economic Equilibrium Model
- A Mixed Complementarity Model of Hydrothermal Electricity Competition in the Western United States
- Complementarity modeling and game theory: a survey
- Mechanism design and auctions for electricity networks
- Solving discretely constrained, mixed linear complementarity problems with applications in energy
- Affinely adjustable robust linear complementarity problems
- A Mixed Complementarity-Based Equilibrium Model of Natural Gas Markets
- On engineering game theory with its application in power systems
- Complementarity problems in restructured natural gas markets
- Nonconvex equilibrium models for energy markets: exploiting price information to determine the existence of an equilibrium
- A smoothing inexact Newton method for nonlinear complementarity problems
- Global optimization of mathematical programs with complementarity constraints and application to clean energy deployment
- Learning by doing: insights from power market modelling in energy economics courses
- Generalized Nash equilibrium models for asymmetric, non-cooperative games on line graphs: application to water resource systems
- Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets
- Equilibrium modeling and solution approaches inspired by nonconvex bilevel programming
- A regularized variance-reduced modified extragradient method for stochastic hierarchical games
- A bilevel programming approach to price decoupling in pay-as-clear markets, with application to day-ahead electricity markets
- Triggering a variety of Nash-equilibria in oligopolistic electricity markets
- A distributed market-clearing framework for highly interconnected electricity and gas systems
- Optimal cooperative global-local advertising with complementary effects in a two-echelon supply chain: a bi-level programming approach
- Integrated assessment of energy policies: decomposing top-down and bottom-up
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