A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
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Publication:2089784
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Cited in
(5)- A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management
- A leader-followers model of power transmission capacity expansion in a market driven environment
- A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management
- A population‐based approach to the bi‐level multifollower problem: an application to the electricity retail market
- A Framework of Peak Load Pricing with Strategic Firms
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