A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
DOI10.1007/S10107-021-01708-0zbMATH Open1501.91035OpenAlexW4226360227MaRDI QIDQ2089784FDOQ2089784
Authors: Veronika Grimm, Daniel Nowak, Lars Schewe, Martin Schmidt, Alexandra Schwartz, Gregor Zöttl 
Publication date: 24 October 2022
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01708-0
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Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
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Cited In (5)
- A population‐based approach to the bi‐level multifollower problem: an application to the electricity retail market
- A Framework of Peak Load Pricing with Strategic Firms
- A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management
- A leader-followers model of power transmission capacity expansion in a market driven environment
- A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management
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