Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. I: Existence and characterization
DOI10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981zbMATH Open1369.91144OpenAlexW2535964670MaRDI QIDQ5277992FDOQ5277992
Authors: Pascale Bendotti, Miroslav Pištěk, Didier Aussel
Publication date: 12 July 2017
Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Electricity spot market with transmission losses
- Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
- Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions
- Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market
- On Cournot equilibria in electricity transmission networks
Cited In (27)
- Electricity day-ahead markets: computation of Nash equilibria
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- Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets
- Evolutionary variational inequality formulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem
- Electricity spot market with transmission losses
- Nash equilibria for coupling of CO\(_{2}\) allowances and electricity markets
- Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: from variational to generalized Nash equilibrium
- A short state of the art on multi-leader-follower games
- On the existence of projected solutions of quasi-variational inequalities and generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
- Nash equilibria in electricity markets with discrete prices.
- On Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in bilevel optimization games
- Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand
- Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: An application to the Spanish electricity market
- Equilibrium values in a competitive power exchange market
- Projected solutions for generalized quasivariational inequalities without compact constraint multimap
- Multiscale control of Stackelberg games
- Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. II: Best response of a producer
- A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
- Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response
- A special three-level optimization problem
- Electricity prices in a game theory context
- The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: a mean-field game approach
- Regularization and approximation methods in Stackelberg games and bilevel optimization
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity
- Optimizing power generation in the presence of micro-grids
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