Nash equilibria for coupling of CO₂ allowances and electricity markets
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Publication:3465136
DOI10.1051/PROC/201445010zbMATH Open1401.91480arXiv1311.1535OpenAlexW2001928707MaRDI QIDQ3465136FDOQ3465136
Authors: Mireille Bossy, Nadia Maïzi, Odile Pourtallier 
Publication date: 29 January 2016
Published in: ESAIM: Proceedings and Surveys (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: In this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions covered.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1535
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- Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. I: Existence and characterization
- Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets
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