Nash equilibria for coupling of CO₂ allowances and electricity markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3465136
Abstract: In this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions covered.
Recommendations
- Nash equilibria in electricity markets with discrete prices.
- Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. I: Existence and characterization
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5284412
- Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets
- Electricity prices in a game theory context
Cited in
(6)- Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets
- Multiperiod coordination models of coal-electricity supply chain with double price regulations
- The zero-emission certificates: A novel CO\(_{2}\)-pollution reduction instrument applied to the electricity market.
- An evolutionary game theory strategy for carbon emission reduction in the electricity market
- Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. I: Existence and characterization
- Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets
This page was built for publication: Nash equilibria for coupling of CO\(_{2}\) allowances and electricity markets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3465136)
