Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets

DOI10.1007/s10287-006-0020-1zbMath1273.91207MaRDI QIDQ867430

Sven Leyffer, Yihsu Chen, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Todd S. Munson

Publication date: 15 February 2007

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-006-0020-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems and Newton methods

Uses Software

• SNOPT
• AMPL
• PATH Solver
• MacMPEC

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
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• A Stochastic Version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Model
• Degenerate Nonlinear Programming with a Quadratic Growth Condition
• Solving mathematical programs with complementarity constraints as nonlinear programs
• SNOPT: An SQP Algorithm for Large-Scale Constrained Optimization
• Local Convergence of SQP Methods for Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
• Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
• Nonlinear programming without a penalty function.