Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints
DOI10.1007/S10107-013-0693-5zbMATH Open1279.90136OpenAlexW2019633675MaRDI QIDQ368752FDOQ368752
Publication date: 23 September 2013
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0693-5
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Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)
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- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Modeling Implicit Collusion Using Coevolution
- Convexity and concavity properties of the optimal value function in parametric nonlinear programming
Cited In (4)
- Nonconvex equilibrium models for gas market analysis: failure of standard techniques and alternative modeling approaches
- An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
- Competition and cooperation in a bidding model of electrical energy trade
- Lying generators: manipulability of centralized payoff mechanisms in electrical energy trade
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