Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints

DOI10.1007/S10107-013-0693-5MaRDI QIDQ368752zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew L. Liu, B. F. Hobbs

Publication date 23 September 2013

Published in Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0693-5

zbMATH Keywords

collusionelectricity marketMPECtransmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1818892 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A pathsearch damped Newton method for computing general equilibria
• Collusive game solutions via optimization
• Convexity and concavity properties of the optimal value function in parametric nonlinear programming
• Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets
• Modeling Implicit Collusion Using Coevolution
• Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
• Solving multi-leader-common-follower games
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• The bargaining problem
• Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms
• Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices

Cited in

(5)

• Nonconvex equilibrium models for gas market analysis: failure of standard techniques and alternative modeling approaches
• Competition and cooperation in a bidding model of electrical energy trade
• Lying generators: manipulability of centralized payoff mechanisms in electrical energy trade
• An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
• Market power in double price cap electricity market

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• BARON

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