Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints

DOI10.1007/s10107-013-0693-5zbMath1279.90136OpenAlexW2019633675MaRDI QIDQ368752

Andrew L. Liu, Benjamin F. Hobbs

Publication date: 23 September 2013

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0693-5

zbMATH Keywords

transmissionelectricity marketcollusionMPEC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)

Related Items (3)

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Uses Software

• BARON

Cites Work

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