Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_11zbMath1417.91352OpenAlexW2499438497MaRDI QIDQ4555511

Polina Kartunova, Alexander Vasin

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_11

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumtransmission capacityelectricity marketdemand functionequilibrium price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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