A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90072-8zbMath0816.90140OpenAlexW2076410719MaRDI QIDQ1342659

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Publication date: 12 January 1995

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90072-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfixed-point theoremnormal form gamedecreasing mappings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Fixed-point and coincidence theorems (topological aspects) (54H25)

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Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Existence of Cournot Equilibrium in Large Markets
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games

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