Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
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The author extends Reny's approach to three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. In this context, he proves the existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite number of individual improvements, under conditions weaker than the celebrated ``better reply security.
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Cites work
- A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
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- Continuity of Preference Relations for Separable Topologies
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- Games with discontinuous payoffs: a strengthening of Reny's existence theorem
- Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
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- Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
- Monotone Comparative Statics
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- Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
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- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
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- Potential games
- Strategic approximations of discontinuous games
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems
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Cited in
(8)- Ordinal status games on networks
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- Equilibria in ordinal status games
- Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
- Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
- When ``better is better than ``best
- Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment
- Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
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