Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities

DOI10.1007/S001820400195MaRDI QIDQ2487966zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi, Tetsuo Yamamori

Publication date 17 August 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400195

zbMATH Keywords

best response dynamicsfinite gamesimprovement pathNash equilibriumstrategic complementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

Finite normal form games are considered. Such a game is said to have the weak finite improvement path (weak FIP) property if for any action profile \(x\), one can go in a finite number of steps from \(x\) to a Nash equilibrium of the game, in a way such that at each step: 1) a single player changes his strategy, and 2) this player increases his payoff. The game is said to have the weak finite best response improvement path (weak FBRP) property if we add to conditions 1) and 2) the following condition 3): this player starts playing a best response against the strategy of the other players. If the game has strategic complementarities (in the sense that action sets are lattices, the single crossing condition and the pseudo-supermodularity condition hold), the authors show that the weak FIP property holds. If additionally the strategies are scalar (action sets are totally ordered), then it is proved that the game has the weak FBRP property.

Recommendations

• Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
• Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
• A characterization of strategic complementarities.
• Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
• Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games

Cited in

(12)

• Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
• Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games
• Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set
• The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• A classification of weakly acyclic games
• Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
• Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
• Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games

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