Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities

DOI10.1007/S001820400195zbMATH Open1102.91005OpenAlexW2042040994MaRDI QIDQ2487966FDOQ2487966

Authors: Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi, Tetsuo Yamamori 

Publication date: 17 August 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400195

Recommendations

• Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbest response dynamicsstrategic complementaritiesfinite gamesimprovement path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cited In (12)

• Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
• Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set
• Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games
• Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences
• A classification of weakly acyclic games
• Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance

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