Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
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Publication:2487966
Recommendations
- Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
- Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
- A characterization of strategic complementarities.
- Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
- Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games
Cited in
(12)- Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
- Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
- Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
- Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set
- Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games
- Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
- Rationalizable strategies in random games
- The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences
- A classification of weakly acyclic games
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
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