Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities (Q2487966)

Finite normal form games are considered. Such a game is said to have the weak finite improvement path (weak FIP) property if for any action profile \(x\), one can go in a finite number of steps from \(x\) to a Nash equilibrium of the game, in a way such that at each step: 1) a single player changes his strategy, and 2) this player increases his payoff. The game is said to have the weak finite best response improvement path (weak FBRP) property if we add to conditions 1) and 2) the following condition 3): this player starts playing a best response against the strategy of the other players. If the game has strategic complementarities (in the sense that action sets are lattices, the single crossing condition and the pseudo-supermodularity condition hold), the authors show that the weak FIP property holds. If additionally the strategies are scalar (action sets are totally ordered), then it is proved that the game has the weak FBRP property.