Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.024zbMath1254.91044OpenAlexW1977390558MaRDI QIDQ1927625

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.024

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesrepeated gamessubgame perfect Nash equilibriacommon payoffsimprovement path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games
• Potential games
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Discounted Dynamic Programming

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