Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (Q684170)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6836910
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| English | Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6836910 |
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Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (English)
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9 February 2018
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The author extends Reny's approach to three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. In this context, he proves the existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite number of individual improvements, under conditions weaker than the celebrated ``better reply security''.
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discontinuous game
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potential game
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Bertrand competition
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strategic complements
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aggregative game
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0.8648291826248169
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0.8563634753227234
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0.8498702645301819
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0.8358857035636902
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0.8354998826980591
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