Aggregate comparative statics

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.009zbMath1281.91011MaRDI QIDQ2436295

Martin Kaae Jensen, Daron Acemoglu

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63294

zbMATH Keywords

aggregative games; public good provision; contests; comparative statics; Cournot model; strategic substitutes; patent races; nice games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B18: Public goods

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests, Teamwork Efficiency and Company Size, The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities, The Selten–Szidarovszky Technique: The Transformation Part, Large Tullock contests, Emergent collaboration in social purpose games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities, Games with strategic complements and substitutes, The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods, Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents, The power of money: wealth effects in contests, Evolution and Kantian morality, The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance, Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes, Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective, Large strategic dynamic interactions, Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty, Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses, Mean field games of timing and models for bank runs, Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games, Large population aggregative potential games, A variational inequality framework for network games: existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis, All-pay contests with performance spillovers, Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency, Credit attribution and collaborative work, Forecast dispersion in finite-player forecasting games, On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests, Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses, Equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games: very practical conditions, Characterizing monotone games, The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go, Changes in risk and strategic interaction, The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences, Media see-saws: winners and losers in platform markets, Special issue: Supermodularity and monotone methods in economics, Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes, A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities, Comparative statics and heterogeneity, Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly, Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations, On the probabilistic feasibility of solutions in multi-agent optimization problems under uncertainty, Expectations-based loss aversion in contests, Ability grouping in contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
• Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes
• Fully aggregative games
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• A generalized theorem of the maximum
• A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
• Comparative statics of fixed points
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Independence, additivity, uncertainty. With contributions by Birgit Grodal
• Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model
• Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models
• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Market Structure and Innovation
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Large Robust Games
• Pseudo-Convex Functions
• The Structure of Utility Functions