The power of money: wealth effects in contests

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.005zbMath1394.91177OpenAlexW3125045204MaRDI QIDQ516971

Fred Schroyen, Nicolas Treich

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

redistributionpowerrisk aversionwealthlobbyingconflictcontestrent-seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Expectations-based loss aversion in contests ⋮ Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests

Cites Work

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• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Aggregate comparative statics
• The Logic of Political Violence
• When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Changes in Background Risk and Risk Taking Behavior
• Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk

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