Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses
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Publication:2140236
DOI10.3934/JDG.2022001zbMATH Open1491.91007OpenAlexW4210319989MaRDI QIDQ2140236FDOQ2140236
Authors: Marco Serena, Luis Corchón 
Publication date: 20 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022001
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Cites Work
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- Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not always with homogeneous oligopoly
- Relative difference contest success function
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