Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1571459 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Relative difference contest success function
- The politics of randomness
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
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