The politics of randomness

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0125-zzbMath1138.91598OpenAlexW3123106221MaRDI QIDQ862536

Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0125-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (13)

Group contest success functions ⋮ Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses ⋮ Optimal lobbying pricing ⋮ Who gains from information asymmetry? ⋮ Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit ⋮ Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Persuasion as a contest ⋮ Foundations for contest success functions ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey ⋮ Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests

Cites Work

• Contest success functions
• Political culture and monopoly price determination
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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