Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
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Publication:660104
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.10.005zbMATH Open1231.91050OpenAlexW2031803084MaRDI QIDQ660104FDOQ660104
Authors: Yohan Pelosse 
Publication date: 25 January 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.005
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
- Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- Contest success functions
- The politics of randomness
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Group contest success functions
- Generalized contest success functions
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
- Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
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- An alternative interpretation of random noise in rank-order tournaments
- Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: the case of telephony
- Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
- Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
- Strategically equivalent contests
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