Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00546-8zbMATH Open1048.91026OpenAlexW2051988713MaRDI QIDQ1811547FDOQ1811547

Authors: Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko 

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00546-8

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame pefect equilibriaundominated sample size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Decision theory for games (91A35) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I

Cited In (9)

• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• A theory of multi-period contest preparation.
• The limits of meritocracy
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Seniority bias in a tournament
• Tournaments with midterm reviews
• Information manipulation and competition
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
• On selecting the right agent

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