Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00546-8MaRDI QIDQ1811547zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko

Publication date 17 June 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00546-8

zbMATH Keywords

subgame pefect equilibriaundominated sample size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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Cites work

• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3155151 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I

Cited in

(9)

• Tournaments with midterm reviews
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• A theory of multi-period contest preparation.
• Information manipulation and competition
• The limits of meritocracy
• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• On selecting the right agent
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
• Seniority bias in a tournament

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