Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00079-9MaRDI QIDQ1602939zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pradeep Dubey, Chien-Wei Wu

Publication date 24 June 2002

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9

zbMATH Keywords

competitive contractcompetitive priceproductive agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
• Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
• Contests with productive effort
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Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.

Cited in

(5)

• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
• Information manipulation and competition
• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests

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