Contests with productive effort

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0393-7MaRDI QIDQ403965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Siegel

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0393-7

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsnon-monotonic payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Simple equilibria in general contests
• All-Pay Contests
• Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
• Success in contests

Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium

Cited in

(20)

• Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
• A note on modelling tournaments
• Incentives versus competitive balance
• Efficiency-based measures of inequality
• Contests on networks
• Contest with pre-contest investment
• Study of psychological preferences in working contest
• Competition and equilibrium effort choice
• Asymmetric endogenous prize contests
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Incentives in lottery contests with draws
• Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
• Far above others
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
• Contests with discontinuous payoffs
• Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
• Pre-contest communication incentives
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Rewarding effort
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

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