Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers

DOI10.3982/te5108arXiv2106.08496OpenAlexW4391139436WikidataQ129476053 ScholiaQ129476053MaRDI QIDQ6194363

Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.08496

zbMATH Keywords

spilloversauctionscontestsall-paywar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• All-pay war
• Asymmetric endogenous prize contests
• All-pay contests with performance spillovers
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
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• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
• EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES
• Volterra Integral Equations
• All-Pay Contests
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• Bargaining and Reputation
• An N‐person war of attrition with the possibility of a noncompromising type
• Comparison Theorems and Integral Inequalities for Volterra Integral Equations
• Equilibrium existence in games with ties

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