Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
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Publication:6194363
DOI10.3982/te5108arXiv2106.08496OpenAlexW4391139436WikidataQ129476053 ScholiaQ129476053MaRDI QIDQ6194363
Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 19 March 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.08496
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
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- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- All-pay war
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- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
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- Volterra Integral Equations
- All-Pay Contests
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
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- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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- Bargaining and Reputation
- An N‐person war of attrition with the possibility of a noncompromising type
- Comparison Theorems and Integral Inequalities for Volterra Integral Equations
- Equilibrium existence in games with ties
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