Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2275672zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Roman M. Sheremeta

Publication date 9 August 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29181/1/MultipleEqTullockContest.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric equilibriumcontestmultiple equilibriarent-seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Recommendations

• Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Manipulations in contests
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Sad-loser contests
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.

Cited in

(21)

• Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
• Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
• That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
• Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly
• Strategically equivalent contests
• Information in Tullock contests
• Equilibrium existence in contests with bid caps
• Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes
• Sad-loser contests
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Structural analysis of Tullock contests with an application to U.S. House of Representatives elections
• Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
• The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
• Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
• Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
• Equivalent modes of reimbursement in augmented contests
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• The role of polarization and hostility on equilibria in a simple class of symmetric conflict models

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