Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions

DOI10.1007/s11238-023-09952-wOpenAlexW4386121839MaRDI QIDQ6123442

Antoni Rubí-Barceló, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 4 March 2024

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09952-w

zbMATH Keywords

symmetric gamesequilibrium characterizationhomogeneous functions' propertiesnon-homogeneous revenue function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)

Cites Work

• Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
• Cournot equilibrium revisited
• Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
• Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
• Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game

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