Strategically equivalent contests
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Publication:2353601
DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9440-5zbMATH Open1377.91010OpenAlexW2170848584WikidataQ59410185 ScholiaQ59410185MaRDI QIDQ2353601FDOQ2353601
Roman M. Sheremeta, Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Publication date: 15 July 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9440-5
Recommendations
- Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
- Contests with a constrained choice set of effort
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)
Cites Work
- All-Pay Contests
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Best response equivalence
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- The politics of randomness
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
- Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
- Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
- Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
- Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
- Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
Cited In (8)
- Equivalent modes of reimbursement in augmented contests
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- An alternative interpretation of random noise in rank-order tournaments
- The lottery contest is a best-response potential game
- Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
- Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
- The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
- Additive multi-effort contests
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