Strategically equivalent contests

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9440-5MaRDI QIDQ2353601zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Roman M. Sheremeta

Publication date 15 July 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9440-5

zbMATH Keywords

equivalencecontestrent-seekingcontest design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

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Cites work

• A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
• All-Pay Contests
• Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
• Best response equivalence
• Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The politics of randomness
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
• Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit

Cited in

(9)

• Equivalent modes of reimbursement in augmented contests
• Additive multi-effort contests
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• An alternative interpretation of random noise in rank-order tournaments
• The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
• Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
• The lottery contest is a best-response potential game
• Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation

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