Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
From MaRDI portal
Publication:433146
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.018zbMATH Open1242.91009OpenAlexW2124391521MaRDI QIDQ433146FDOQ433146
Publication date: 13 July 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.4063
Recommendations
Cites Work
- The Probability Weighting Function
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Unequal inequalities. I, II
- Contest success functions
- Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- The politics of randomness
- The Demand Theory of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
- Group contest success functions
- Egalitarianism and incentives
- Generalized contest success functions
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves
- In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility
- Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Persuasion as a contest
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q433146)
