Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.018MaRDI QIDQ433146zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Dahm, Luis Corchón

Publication date 13 July 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.4063

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functionendogenous contestsmixed-strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Foundations for contest success functions
• A contest success function for rankings
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3910084 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4087381 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2122817 (Why is no real title available?)
• Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves
• Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
• Contest success functions
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• Egalitarianism and incentives
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Generalized contest success functions
• Group contest success functions
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility
• Persuasion as a contest
• Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The Demand Theory of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
• The Probability Weighting Function
• The politics of randomness
• Unequal inequalities. I, II

Cited in

(4)

• Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses
• Strategically equivalent contests
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests

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