Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0622-xzbMath1282.91140MaRDI QIDQ1941986

Leonid Polishchuk, Alexander Tonis

Publication date: 25 March 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0622-x

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; rent seeking; Bayesian mechanism design; contest success functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs, Innovation contests with entry auction, Probabilistic procurement auctions, Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach, Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes, Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses, Strategically equivalent contests, Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests, Contests with dominant strategies, Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests

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