Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0709MaRDI QIDQ1972844zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeon-Koo Che, Ian Gale

Publication date 25 June 2000

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1aed26022962972f1d80de15daf752cab99b7607

zbMATH Keywords

contest gamesequilibriumrent-seeking games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
• All-Pay Contests
• Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games

Cites work

• Contest success functions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3722946 (Why is no real title available?)
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(37)

• Multi-battle contests
• Centralized vs decentralized contests
• Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• The limits of meritocracy
• Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses
• Success in contests
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Relative difference contest success function
• Strategically equivalent contests
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• The affectionate society: Does competition for partners promote friendliness?
• Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
• The even split rule in positive assortative matching
• Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
• Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
• A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
• All-pay auctions with ties
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Optimal tie-breaking rules
• The n-player Hirshleifer contest
• A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis
• New axiomatization of a difference-form contest success function
• Persuasion as a contest
• Market structure and extortion: evidence from 50,000 extortion payments
• Difference-form group contests
• Rent dissipation in difference-form contests
• The power of passivity in the Hirshleifer contest under small noise
• Elections with platform and valence competition

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