Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions

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Publication:1972844

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0709zbMath0938.91003OpenAlexW2037023440MaRDI QIDQ1972844

Ian Gale, Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 25 June 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1aed26022962972f1d80de15daf752cab99b7607




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