Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
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Publication:2411525
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.003zbMath1415.91137OpenAlexW3121738392MaRDI QIDQ2411525
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.003
payoff equivalencecontestsincreasing returnsrevenue equivalencemixed-strategy Nash equilibriumrobustness of the all-pay auction
Related Items (11)
The limits of meritocracy ⋮ Success in contests ⋮ On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power ⋮ Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization ⋮ Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ How noise affects effort in tournaments ⋮ Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
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