Sequential two-prize contests

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9zbMath1262.91089OpenAlexW3123347450MaRDI QIDQ690690

Aner Sela

Publication date: 28 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0803.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionsmulti-stage contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Two-stage elimination games ⋮ The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence ⋮ Contests with insurance ⋮ A model of a two-stage all-pay auction ⋮ Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results ⋮ Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints ⋮ Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning

Cites Work

• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Multi-battle contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contest architecture

This page was built for publication: Sequential two-prize contests