Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning

DOI10.1007/s10058-017-0205-9zbMath1422.91318OpenAlexW2750835174MaRDI QIDQ2318125

Aner Sela

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0205-9

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionstwo-stage contestseffort-dependent rewards

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests ⋮ Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests ⋮ Gaining advantage by winning contests ⋮ Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes

Cites Work

• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Sequential two-prize contests
• The optimal design of rewards in contests
• Multi-battle contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Dynamic contests with resource constraints
• Contests with limited resources
• Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence
• Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
• Contest architecture
• The Colonel Blotto game
• All-Pay Contests
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources

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